This paper develops a decision making empirical method to evaluate welfare programs accounting for heterogeneity of impacts. We find outcome predictive distributions for different subgroups of the population and use a characterization of second order stochastic dominance to give a policy recommendation conditional on covariates with minimal requirements on the social planner's utility function. Further, we can estimate quantile treatment effects within subgroups. We apply this method to the Connecticut's Jobs First program and find subgroups for which the program may have been welfare enhancing even though some statistics may suggest the opposite and viceversa.
Introduction
Studies evaluating social programs usually concentrate on overall population measures that miss the possible heterogeneity in the program impacts. Knowledge of the degree of heterogeneity is relevant to policy makers when extending the program to another jurisdiction or when reducing the number of beneficiaries since that may or may not bring potential welfare losses. This paper considers an empirical method to infer the heterogeneous impacts of social programs and how to map those into decisions using expected utility theory.
The problem can arise in the following situation, before implementing the social program to a larger population, a pilot phase is run in order to get insight about its benefits. Using the data collected in that phase, the social planner has to decide whether to implement the program or not on a larger sample, also the planner could decide to restrict the application of the program to a smaller population. The classical approach to answer this question is to find an overall treatment effect of the program and if it is statistically significant different from zero and positive, the program is likely to be preserved or extended. Here we propose a method to make inference on the treatment effect conditional on covariates even if the sample is very small within the subgroups, which brings a curse of dimensionality problem, and how to use that information in a decision making process.
Specifically, we find the probability distributions of potential outcomes for treated and controls for different subgroups of the population defined by covariates using a hierarchical Bayesian model. Then we can determine whether a social planner with a strictly increasing and concave utility function would prefer to assign a similar individual to the treatment or not by taking the expectation over the potential outcomes probability distributions. This can be done without having to specify the functional form of the planner's utility function 1 . Moreover, with knowledge of the outcome distributions we can also calculate quantile treatment effects within the subgroups. Thus the method gives not only information on the heterogeneity across subgroups but also within.
1 Specific conditions on the utility function are discussed later in the paper. The method is agnostic in two cases: a risk-neutral social planner and positive conditional average treatment effect, and in the absence of second order stochastic dominance.
A few papers
2 have considered the program evaluation assessment as a statistical decision problem: by proposing a measure of the value of covariate information and how the higher the variation in the treatment response as a function of covariates, the higher that value (Manski [2001] , Manski [2004] ); by looking at predictive outcome distributions for treated and controls and then using first order stochastic dominance to rank those distributions (Dehejia [2005] );
by extending and analyzing Manski's approach to what the rules of assignment converge to in distribution when a loss function evaluates the decision rule and its interaction with risk rather than pure statistical rules (Hirano and Porter [2009] ); by constructing a framework to evaluate policies using quasi-experimental data (Kasy [2013] ); and by deriving asymptotic frequentist confidence intervals for welfare gains in randomized assignment experiments when there are budget constraints (Bhattacharya and Dupas [2012] ).
On the other hand, another rather small branch of the literature has looked into the empirical problems to measure the heterogeneity of treatment effects (Abrevaya et al. [2012] , Bitler et al. [2006] , Bitler et al. [2010] ); and by considering the theoretical issues of the hierarchical Bayesian models for evaluation programs when there is heterogeneity and the use of an empirical Bayesian approach (Chamberlain [2011] ). The use of Bayesian methods to estimate treatment effects dates back to Rubin [1978] 3 .
More recently, a related branch of the literature has focused on extending Bayesian inference methods for the heterogeneity of endogenous treatment effects. Hu et al. [2011] and Hu [2011] for example use a Dirichlet process mixture to determine the number of components of heterogeneity based on a three-equation selection model. One equation for the selection, one for the treated, and one for the controls. Chib et al. [2009] propose a four-equation model to simultaneously allow for sample selection, endogeneity, and nonparametric covari-2 Imbens and Wooldridge [2009] describe how the literature has concentrated on the overall treatment effect and argue that this would only make sense if we were to mandate exposure to the treatment to either everyone in the population or to no one, which in practice that is not usually the case.
3 He studies the estimation of causal effects by finding the predictive distribution of the outcomes that correspond to the treatments that are not available in the experiment. The idea is that the unobservable outcomes (because an individual can be assigned to either the treatment or to the control group but not both) are missing data and those values can be imputed by giving a prior distribution on the potential outcomes. After this paper, little had been done on estimating treatment effects using Bayesian techniques (Imbens [2004] ), perhaps because of the intensive computational requirements.
ate effects. In their Bayesian implementation of the model there is no need to augment the data to impute missing values due to the selection mechanism as opposed to the general nonfrequentist approach to latent variable models. Li and Tobias [2011] propose a three-equation model and its Bayesian inference to obtain heterogenous causal effects. The model allows for joint inference on the determinants of the outcome, the endogenous treatment variable, and an individual-specific component of the causal effect. But instead of keeping these individual effects throughout the inference, individuals are exogenously put in different groups leading to determining heterogeneity using a mixture model over these groups, not across the individuals 4 . In general, estimation of treatment effects for small samples or for very restrictive subsets of covariates has been avoided because of the potential lack of statistical significance under classical approaches 5 .
The method we develop in this paper connects these two branches of the literature. We use a model that captures correlations across the subgroups of the population through a hierarchical Bayesian model and then second order stochastic dominance to map the within subgroups probability distributions of potential outcomes into expected utility values 6 . In our case we do not model any self-selection issue in the data, but focus on the randomized experiment on those who signed up for cash assistance. Moreover, our approach keeps parametric assumptions at a minimum. An element in common with this literature is that in order to implement the methods, it is needed to exogenously assume a number of subgroups in the population over which heterogenous effects can be determined; Bayes factors or other criteria could be used to choose the number of the subgroups.
Perhaps the closest papers to ours are Bitler et al. [2010] and Dehejia [2005] . In the former they measured heterogenous impacts of the Connecticut's Jobs First program by 4 There is another branch of the literature developing tests to isolate the covariates that have an impact on an outcome out of a large collection of covariates. This is the typical situation in studies attempting to identify the genes associated with a specific disease, as in Efron [2011] .
5 Graham and Hirano [2011] discuss the performance of different estimators when there are no observations for particular combinations of covariates values.
6 At a broader scale, methods to estimate treatment effects can be classified as follows: (i) regressions of the outcome on the covariates and a treatment dummy, (ii) matching on covariates, (iii) using the propensity score, (iv) combinations of those methods, and (v) Bayesian methods. Imbens [2004 ] Heckman [2010 gives an in-depth analysis of the state-of-the-art on the structural versus the reduced form approaches to do empirical work on program evaluation.
looking at the differences in income between treated and controls at each different quantile of the income distribution for different subgroups of the population. Then they developed a test for the null that conditional treatment effects across subgroups are the same. This is similar to our work in that by using completely different methods we find a high degree of heterogeneity. The main difference is that we can rank distributions. Dehejia [2005] , using data from a randomized experiment, estimates posterior densities for the treatment effects and evaluates under different scenarios the maximization of welfare using the posterior densities. His contribution is that he models program evaluation as a decision problem. For example, in order to decide whether all the individuals should be assigned to the treatment.
Another scenario is the one of a caseworker that has to decide if a person should be assigned to the treatment or to the control group. In order to carry out these decisions, he uses classical expected utility theory since the predictive distributions for the outcomes are known in a Bayesian framework. The main difference with respect to that paper is that we also condition on covariates so that the heterogeneity problem overlaps with expected utility rankings.
We apply the method to the Connecticut's Jobs First program. This arose as one of the welfare reform experiments in the U.S. caused by the elimination of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program in 1996. The Federal government required the states to replace AFDC with programs that had a time limit to participate and that would enhance job training. Thus we focus in this paper on the transitional program Jobs First implemented in Connecticut, specifically in Manchester and New Haven. The welfare experiment consisted in randomly assigning 4,803 people with at least one dependent children to either AFDC or to Jobs First 7 . The outcome of interest is the average quarterly amount of earnings over the first seven quarters after inception to the experiment since positive earnings directly reflect employment, which is the main program's objective. One of the main differences of Jobs First with respect to AFDC is that the former has a limit of time of cash assistance of 21 months plus 6 months if an extension is requested and approved. This feature coupled with the requirement of following a job training program instead of just general education programs, 7 Of these, 96% were women.
were expected to make a difference in the level of the impacts 8 . It is however unclear how the program impacts vary with covariates, and even less so how to make decisions on extensions of the program based on expected utility arguments. The impacts here are the differences between the outcome level if the individual was in the experimental group and the outcome level if she was in the control group.
Our results suggest that even though classical statistical measures of conditional treatment effects on earnings are negative for 9 out of 24 subgroups, only 5 of them are welfaredecreasing. When using total average income -earnings plus transfers-, the conditional average treatment effect for only one subgroup in our main specification is negative, when using the expected utility approach there are two other subgroups for which exposure to the treatment does not maximize utility. This difference is due to the curse of dimensionality when trying to estimate expected values using very small sample sizes, and the lack of use of information across subgroups. There is also a high degree of heterogeneity in quantile treatment effects within the subgroups. A second specification in which pre-treatment covariates are discarded when forming the subgroups wipes out most of the heterogeneity.
We believe it is relevant to understand the impacts of social programs not just as an overall measure for the entire population but rather how large the heterogeneity of these impacts is and how to make assignment decisions based on robust theoretical expected utility results that do not depend on particular functional forms but only minimal conditions. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the definitions and formal statements of the problem. Details on Jobs First and some data issues are explained in Section 3. Section 4 presents a hierarchical Bayesian model and a Gibbs sampler. Finally, in Section 5 we present the connection between predictive income distributions and expected utility theory as well as the main results. Section 6 concludes.
8 For more details on Jobs First see the MDRC's Final Report (Adams-Ciardullo et al. [2002] ).
A social planner is trying to decide whether an individual should be assigned to a treatment or not to maximize an outcome. In this paper, the main outcome is earnings and we do robustness checks using total income. Equivalent outcomes in other applications are health quality, level of education, and in general, any outcome of a social program that can be quantified. Our social planner has data on N individuals. The data for each individual consist of individual characteristics, whether the individual received the treatment or not, and the outcome. Individuals are randomly assigned to receive the treatment or not. Each individual is characterized by a vector of covariates X i of size 1 × K. Denote by T i = 1 if individual is exposed to treatment and by T i = 0 if the individual is not. The outcome will be denoted by
Since treatment is completely at random, the unconfoundedness assumption which captures the idea that treatment assignment is exogeneous conditioned on X i is automatically satisfied,
Thus, conditioning on X, treatment assignment is independent of the potential outcome. However, the realization of T does affect which outcome is observed.
We are interested in estimating the effect of being under the treatment for a given X.
As one observes either Y i (0) or Y i (1) but not both at the same time for individual i, we always have some uncertainty in one of the two outcomes. The statistic of interest is the difference between the outcomes had the individual been in both cases. We call this quantity the average treatment effect (ATE),
A cell is each of the elements of the discretization over all the covariates. If we are interested in the treatment effect for individuals in the cell X = x, we define the conditional average treatment effect (CATE),
Note that this can be interpreted as an average treatment effect for a group of individuals with characteristics X = x. We can rewrite β(x) as β(
First proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin [1983] .
ATE can be obtained by taking the expectation with respect to X,
This suggests that estimation for β(x) consists of two parts,
and β 0 (x) = E(Y |T = 0, X = x). A simple estimator for the CATE can be constructed using sample means,β
where N 1 (x) is the number of individuals with covariate X = x and under the treatment.
An estimator for the CATE is the differencê
It is a consistent estimator 10 and its variance is V ar(β(
where σ 2 1 (x) and σ 2 0 (x) are the variance of the outcomes for the treated and the controls respectively when X = x. By replacing the variances with their sample analogs we have
Our problem is to find a rule to decide whether a new individual N + 1 should be assigned to the treatment or not. Suppose that the social planner wants to maximize the population mean outcome of the treatment if she has an increasing and concave utility function. This is equivalent to maximize the outcome of each individual. That is, conditional on X, she wants to choose T N +1 such that
10 By using the unconfoundedness assumption to get the third equality,
so that the population mean outcome is E(max t∈{0,1} {E(Y (t)|X)}), where the outside expectation is with respect to X (see Manski [2001] ). In order to compute the last expectation we need the entire distribution of Y (t)|X and not just one point statistic. It is clear that the function E(Y (t)|X) is identified given the random assigment, but as the partition becomes finer we get to a curse of dimensionality problem and there might not be in the data enough individuals to estimate this function. We can use some non-parametric approach to infer the distribution, or a Bayesian model that as an output gives us the desired distribution.
We opt for the latter since it easily handles correlations across different subgroups. Those correlations should not arise given the random assignment of the treatment, however the small sample sizes of the subgroups might induce across-subgroups correlation.
We use a characterization of second order stochastic dominance. This criterion for ranking distributions relies on the inspection of the cumulative areas under each distribution function.
If for every point in the domain the cumulative area of the distribution function of one random variable is lower than for another random variable's, we say that the former second order stochastic dominates the latter. The well-known result we use in this paper is that for two random variables X and Z, E(u(X)) ≥ E(u(Z)) for any strictly increasing and concave function u if and only if X second order stochastically dominates Z. The latter statement can be easily evaluated using the predictive income distributions obtained from the data.
The assigning rule would now be to take the (N + 1)-th individual, and according to her characteristics X N +1 = x, she would belong to one of the subgroups, and she would be assigned to the treatment if the random variable Y |T = 1, X = x second order stochastically
The social planner has some information to decide how to discretize each covariate. In the empirical application it is assumed that this criterion is exogenous to the problem of maximization of the expected value of the outcome and the level of discretization is left for future research. For example, if the covariate is age the social planner might discretize the variable into young, adults and seniors according to specific ranges for the covariate age. If the sample is large enough the level of discretization can be less coarse. In the example, young, adults and seniors are the three cells obtained by the discretization. For identification purposes, we require that in each of the cells there is at least one individual under the treatment and at least one individual in the control group. That is, in each segment of each covariate there exists at least one pair (X i , Y i (0)) and at least one pair (X i , Y i (1)). Once we have the discretization for each covariate we can form subgroups of individuals according to all the possible combinations of the segments. This means that we take the cartesian product over the segments of the covariates. In this way, every individual belongs to exactly one subgroup and only one and each subgroup contains at least one pair (X i , Y i (0)) and one First was one of the very first programs with all the TANF main features to be implemented, and it is thus one of the few examples available to get an insight on the performance of TANF programs versus the previous AFDC format. The main differences between the two are that TANF-type programs have time limits, different implied rates of taxation, and work requirements where as AFDC did not.
11
The time limit consisted of a maximum allowable period of 21 months of cash assistance, with the possibility of an extension of 6 months if the recipient complied with requirements for an exemption. AFDC stops providing assistance when all children are 18 or older. TANF now allows for up to 60 months of cash assistance. We should keep in mind though that about two thirds of those in our sample who reached the time limit under Jobs First were approved the extension of 6 months. This is why we look at the quarterly average of earnings over the first seven quarters after inception to the program.
The second key feature of Jobs First is that the earnings from working are completely 11 Adams-Ciardullo et al. [2002] . These impacts range from 0 to $800. The impacts increase with the quantile and then decrease towards the upper quantiles. This may be attributed to an opt-in effect as some individuals might lower their income in order to be eligible for the program. The type of heterogeneity they looked at is the difference between the cumulative distribution of income for the treated and for the controls at each different quantile 15 . These large variations in 12 Federal Poverty Line, which was $1,138 per month for a family of three people in 1998. 13 AFDC disregarded $120 plus 33% of earnings per month during the first four months in the program. During months 5-12 only $120 per month were disregarded. After 12 months only $90 were disregarded per month when calculating the food stamps benefits.
14 Income is defined as the sum of earnings from working and the food stamps benefits. 15 The horizontal difference between the graphs of the cumulative distribution functions for any given the impacts conditional on income quantiles can be further decomposed into heterogeneous impacts conditional on covariates. This is possible using the method proposed in this paper.
The sample consists of 2,396 Jobs First recipients and 2,407 AFDC recipients, making a total of 4,803 families. In this paper we focus on four covariates: age, whether the individual was employed before inception to the program, number of children, and high school degree.
Summary statistics for the entire sample are shown in Table 2 . The partition of the sample consists of the cartesian product of the segments created in each variable as follows: the covariate age is segmented in two parts depending on whether the parent is at least 30 years old or not; a dummy variable for employment before the program; dummy variables for being pregnant or with one kid, with two kids, or with three or more kids; and whether the parent has a high school degree or not. This gives a total of J = 24 subgroups and a total of 4,463 observations due to missing values in the high school degree covariate. Table 1 describes the subgroups and Table 2 shows summary statistics for the entire sample. As explained before, our main outcome of interest is the quarterly average of earnings since it reflects the program's main objective: employment. Over the first seven quarters, 27% of the sample has zero earnings, 5.5% no transfers, and 1.2% neither. This produces a mass point over zero on the empirical earnings distributions due to the individuals who are unemployed, an issue we further discuss in the next section.
The particular choice of the subgroups is certainly exogenous in the model. This however has been done using covariates that the Final Report uses as explanatory variables in their estimation of impacts. Bitler et al. [2010] use the same covariates as well to diagnose subgroup heterogeneity in Jobs First. In general this is a good approach to form the subgroups because it is realistic to think that a social planner extending or constraining the program to a different population will be able to sustain her criteria if they are based on such covariates because age can determine your expertise in your job and the number of kids your actual economic needs. Having being previously employed is also used as a criterion for welfare aid, such as in unemployment benefits. Even though we have data on race, we believe its use in reality number between 0 and 1. For example, at the q-th quantile, the difference Y 1,q −Y 0,q is the quantile treatment effect, where F i (Y i,q ) = q is the cumulative distribution function of income Y for group i.
could bring problems as it could be taken as racial profiling. In the robustness section we discuss two other different specifications for the subgroups, using the race information and using only non-historical covariates. We also discuss the results when the outcome is the average total income -earnings plus transfers-over the first seven quarters of inception to the program.
As a benchmark for the results, Table 3 and Table 4 report the estimates for the CATEs using the estimator (1). We can see the tremendous amount of variation between the subgroups' CATEs. The goal is to find which subgroups have a high value for their CATE, not only by taking the within subgroup sample means because of the lack of statistical significance we could get in some of the subgroups, but from a decision making standpoint. Column 10 in Table 3 and Table 4 shows the t-statistic for the null hypothesis that the CATE is zero 16 and how in most subgroups the null hypothesis cannot be strongly rejected. This paper proposes how to calculate predictive probability distributions for income and how to use them in an expected utility maximization setting.
Estimation and Results
Once the subgroups are formed, the sample can be described by pairs (T ij , Y ij ) where i represents the individual observation and j is the index for different subgroups in the sample.
Each subgroup can have a different number of observations, so i = 1, . . . , n j and j = 1, . . . , J where J is the number of subgroups. One could estimate the CATEs by taking the difference of the sample means in each subgroup but this might not give any meaningful results since the size of the subgroup could be very small. That would not be taking into account the correlation with other cells either. Table 3 and Table 4 show the results. There are two observations to make, first, statistical significance of these differences as measured by the t-statistic is rarely found, and second, among the CATEs that exhibit certain degree of significance it is evident that the size of the program impacts substantially differs from one 16 These are calculated to test whether the two means are statistically significantly different. The statistic
where S 2 i are the sample variances for the treated and the controls. See Dehejia [2008] for more details on rules-of-thumb for inference of treatment effects.
subgroup to another. The former is just a consequence of the lack of statistical power of this simple estimator on small sample sizes. The second suggests that in effect, the impact of the program is not constant across subgroups. A different approach, which also relies on asymptotics, is to create dummy variables for each subgroup and then estimate a linear model on these dummies and their interactions with the treatment indicator variable. The results are available from the author upon request. Once again, it is rare to come across with a statistically significant coefficient.
A Hierarchical Bayesian Model
To overcome issues of estimators that rely on asymptotics we use a Bayesian approach instead.
We assume that each realization of the random variable Y ij is an independent draw from a normal distribution,
This way, each subgroup has its own mean µ j and own precision τ µ j 17 . We want to capture that these means are not independent, equivalently, there is some correlation across the subgroups 18 . Assume an underlying common distribution for all the subgroups from which we draw these means,
where µ is the overall outcome mean. If we independently draw from that distribution we have that the subgroup means µ j |µ are conditionally independent. However, without conditioning on µ, the subgroup means are correlated. To see why, we complete this model with two more layers and then compute the correlation across subgroups.
Assume the prior on µ and on ν,
17 We assume the traditional notation in the Bayesian literature in which the second parameter of the normal distribution specification refers to the precision not the variance.
18 As discussed earlier, in principle there should not be any correlation since assignment to treatment is random but the curse of dimensionality may bring a non-negligible correlation across subgroups. and a gamma density prior on τ µ j for each j = 1, . . . , J,
The parameters h 3 , α and β are fixed. Since we do not know how the subgroup means µ j are allocated with respect to µ, we give a prior on the precision h 1 that captures whether the subgroups share more or less information. A flexible prior is a gamma distribution with most of its mass close to the origin which is equivalent to have a difuse prior on µ j 19 20 .
Suppose that the subgroups are very similar to each other, then the subgroup means µ j will be similar as well. On the other hand, if the subgroups do not share much information, we expect the subgroup means µ j to be very different and the posterior distribution should be using little information from µ to estimate the subgroup means. This completes the model, a hierarchical Bayesian model.
Alternatively, we can rewrite the model as µ j = µ + j with j ∼ N (0, h 1 ), and µ = ν + µ with µ ∼ N (0, h 2 ). This implies that
Thus the variance of a subgroup and the covariance between two given subgroups are respectively,
If the subgroups are very different from each other, the covariance between two subgroups should be small, large h 2 , and thus the variance of one single subgroup mean primarily depends on the size of h The full conditional density is proportional to
where each term of the product above is the kernel of the densities for Y ij , {µ j } j=1,...,J , µ and
The estimation is done using a Gibbs sampler. In general, this method produces, when the number of iterations is large enough, a random draw from some density p(θ|A), where θ is the random vector of interest and A is the set of fixed parameters. Assume that θ can be decomposed in blocks of parameters θ = (θ 1 , θ 2 ), so that p(θ|A) can be written as p(θ 1 |θ 2 , A) and as p(θ 2 |θ 1 , A) and it is possible to get random draws from these two densities. In this setting, a Gibbs sampler consists of getting a random draw θ
where the superscripts denote the number of the iteration, then getting a random draw θ (1) 2 from p(θ 2 |θ (1) 1 , A). Note that an initial value was needed in order to sample from p(θ 1 |θ 2 , A), and also note that we update the values of θ i in the next iteration. If the iteration is done N times, we get a random sample of size N of draws for θ 1 and for θ 2 . Under some general conditions, it can be shown that
2 ).
for large values of N.
Going back to the estimation of CATEs, it is of interest to write down the joint distribution as a set of full conditional distributions. Because of the form of the joint distribution in this particular setting, we can write the full conditional distributions as
where µ −j is the collection of the µ k with k = j. These three densities can be used in a Gibbs sampler. We can see that the posterior mean of the subgroup means 24 µ j |A is a weighted average of the outcomes within the subgroup and the overall outcome mean µ. The precision is a weighted sum of the precision of the income for subgroup j and the precision of µ j . The overall mean µ is weighted by the precision of subgroup j. Also, the precision of the overall distribution is weighted by the precision of group j. Observe that if n j increases -there are more individuals in subgroup j-, the posterior precision τ µ j n j + h 1 increases, which is a good attribute of the model.
22 See Geweke [2005] . 23 See Appendix for details. 24 The letter A henceforth will denote all the parameters and data we are conditioning on at that particular step of the sampler.
From the posterior distribution of µ we see that its posterior mean is almost the average of the subgroup means, but the denominator contains the term h 2 /h 1 . This suggests that h 2 /h 1 should be small compared to J, the number of subgroups, in order to let the data dominate and not the initial values of the parameters. Then, in the specification of the priors we will require h 2 < h 1 . As shown in the Appendix, the posterior distributions for these hyperparameters do not explicitly depend on the value of the observations. The posterior precision suggests that when the number of subgroups increases, the precision is higher and that h 2 , the precision in the prior for µ, should be very small to have an uninformative prior on µ.
The third posterior distribution is for the subgroup precisions. Observe that these hyperparameters do not depend on h 1 nor h 2 in the conditional density, but in the number of total observations and the overall sum of the squares of the deviations from the subgroup means. The parameters α and β should take on values that do not dominate the data. Let
2 . The mean of τ µ j is clearly not dominated by the parameters if α is much smaller than half the size of the smallest subgroup, and if β is much smaller than . However, when there is not much variation in the outcomes within the subgroup, i.e.
when → 0, the expected value should be large enough to reflect the fact that the subgroup variance is close to 0. Therefore (α + n j /2)/β cannot be too small. At the same time, the variance for this conditional density is (α + n j /2)/(β + ) 2 and it should be relatively larger in the → 0 case since there is not much information to accurately infer the subgroup variance.
A good compromise on these parameter values is as shown in Table 5 and robustness checks are discussed at the end of the next section.
Finally, a discussion on the prior for h 1 . As mentioned before, the precision of the distribution of µ j is h 1 ∼ G(γ, γ), and a similar prior for h 2 applies. Another possibility is to use a generalized inverse gamma prior, but since our model is parameterized with the precisions, not with the variances, it is more tractable to use gamma densities. Remember that the posterior distribution for µ suggests that h 2 < h 1 is a good selection for the initial value of these parameters. The posterior distribution for h 1 |A −h 1 , where A −h 1 represents the rest of the parameters, is subgroup means µ j are very far from each other then the posterior mean for h 1 is close to zero, which implies a large variance in the distribution of the subgroup means. The posterior density for h 2 is h 2 |A −h 2 ∼ G(γ + 1/2, γ + 1 2 µ 2 ) so the dispersion of the subgroup means depends on their overall mean and initial parameters, however the influence of the latter is negligible compared to the size of the other arguments.
The posterior densities above form a Gibbs sampler. Given some initial values for (µ j , τ µ j )
for j = 1, . . . , J and µ, the posterior distribution for µ j is known and we can get a draw from that distribution and update those values to draw a value for µ, then we use that value to draw values for the τ µ j s from their posterior distribution. We repeat this process until getting convergence for all the posterior distributions. The estimation is made separately for the treated and the controls. The CATE for subgroup j is defined as µ is the prior from which the overall mean for the treated and the overall mean for the controls are drawn as in (2). The specification also allows for different variances for the overall mean of treated and controls, respectively.
As pointed out above, the data show evidence of censoring close to the zero earnings point. To alleviate this problem we include, on top of the Gibbs sampler explained above, a data augmentation step for Tobit models first proposed by Chib [1992] . Once the mass point at the extreme left of the distribution has been replaced with hypothetical negative observations, the Gibbs sampler above is applied in the exact same way as before 26 .
Posterior CATEs
After an amount of iterations of the Gibbs sampler 27 and a burn-in phase 28 the histograms for all the parameters' posterior distributions show convergence in distribution, see Figure 2 which shows the time series of one of the Markov chains for selected parameters from the treated subsample. We can now calculate posterior means for the parameters, in particular we are interested in the posterior means for µ j and the τ µ j . Table 6 presents the results 26 See Appendix for details. 27 2,000 iterations for the outer loop and 2,000 iterations for the data augmentation step at each iteration of the outer loop.
28 The first 1,000 draws from the Gibbs sampler are discarded to avoid any influence from the initial parameters of the priors in the final results. Figure 3 and the last two columns of Table 3 show these results. Figure 3 plots the kernel density estimates for the distribution of the posterior of CATEs for earnings.
These densities can be used as well for calculating the probability of a positive treatment impact. Most subgroups' CATEs distributions span over the negative values range, leading to unclear evidence of any gains from the program.
We also run the model when the outcome is total average income. The posterior means for this case are shown in the last two columns of Table 4 . The sign of the treatment effect does not change in the posterior means with respect to the sample means results. However, the level of the effects slightly changes in most cases. We can also see from the posterior densities of the CATEs the heterogeneity of the impacts within each of the subgroups. For example, subgroups 9, 10, 12, and 15 have a lot of heterogeneity if measured by the spread 29 We further discuss sensitivity to different initial parameter values in the section on robustness checks. 30 The next section explains how to construct predictive earnings distributions.
of the distribution. The first three correspond to people who were previously employed and no high school degree, whereas the last one corresponds to people with high school degree and three or more children 31 .
Welfare
We can form predictive distributions for the outcome in the following way.
1. Get a random draw from the posterior distributions p(µ j |A −µ j ) and p(τ µ j |A −τµ j ).
Get a random draw from p(Y ij |A).
Where A represents all the other parameters and data respectively updated at each step.
Since this posterior distribution is the one of a normal, we censored the negative random draws to get back to the original format of the data, that is, non-negative earnings or income. Had we not done this censoring and just taken sample means over the non-censored random draws, those means would be negative in some cases, that is why in Table 6 some of the subgroup control posterior means are equal to zero. The same censoring applies when computing the CATE posterior means in Table 3 and Table 4 but not for the CATE densities shown in Figure 3 .
The social planner is concerned with the optimal choice of subgroups to be assigned to or exempted from the treatment in order to maximize welfare. Using the definition of second order stochastic dominance we can get a natural welfare interpretation of the relationship between the posterior predictive distributions within each group.
Define G X (a) as the integral of the cumulative distribution function,
for a random variable X with density dF X and a real number a. Using this notation, a random variable X second order stochastically dominates (SOSD) a random variable Y if
31 The complete results on average income are available upon request.
for all a in the support of the distributions, where G i is defined as above.
A well-known result on stochastic dominance relates expected utility theory and SOSD.
This result allows us to translate our problem into an expected utility inequality. A random variable X SOSD the random variable Y if and only if E X (u(X)) ≥ E Y (u(Y )) for all increasing and concave functions u, where the operator E X (·) represents the expected value with respect to the distribution of X 32 .
Thus, if the social planner has a utility function that is increasing and concave she will always prefer X to Y if X SOSD Y 33 . From the predictive posterior distributions we can get the CDFs and compute the quantity G X (a) for the treated and for the controls for any given range of values for a. Specifically, we choose a to be positive and no larger than the maximum quarterly income observation in the data. This guarantees that we are ranking the two distributions for income values within the appropriate domain of this random variable.
The ranking may not exist or change for very large values of a, but since we do not observe individuals getting such large values, the ranking is irrelevant at those points. By doing this we can examine whether the relation (3) holds, if that is the case we can determine whether the social planner prefers one outcome over the other, all this without having to specify any particular functional form for the utility function, other than requiring it to be increasing and concave. Furthermore, there is no need to run any kind of statistical test since we integrated out all the parameter uncertainty. There are cases however, in which the method is agnostic as to what ranking is welfare maximizing. For example, if u(Y ) = Y and CAT E(X = x) > 0 then a risk-neutral social planner prefers treatment assignment even though there may not be SOSD. Thus for the following results to hold, we need to restrict our attention to strictly increasing and concave utility functions. Figure 4 shows the CDFs by subgroup for average earnings and Figure 5 and Figure 6 show the graphs for differences between the functions G i (·) for the treated (i = 1) and for the controls (i = 0) for average earnings and total income respectively. The CDFs also give a stochastic ranking according to the first order stochastic dominance. However, we could get 32 For a proof of this result see Green et al. [1995] . 33 Another characterization of SOSD is that X SOSD Y is equivalent to a mean-preserving spread of the distribution of X in order to obtain the distribution of Y , see Green et al. [1995] .
intersections of the two CDFs for the same subgroup and there is no natural link with utility theory when this happens 34 . Thus we look for the subgroups where the distribution for the treated SOSD the one from the controls. This would look as negative values for the functions in Figure 5 and Figure 6 and because of the characterization above this would mean that the expected utility of having that subgroup exposed to the treatment is greater than the same subgroup's utility when left as a control. This seems to occur in most cases for total income, although in most of them there is indifference at low income levels. These results suggest that subgroups 3, 10, and 23 would not have been picked to be exposed to the treatment In the case of earnings, 5 out of the 24 subgroups exhibit SOSD from being exposed to the control over being exposed to the treatment. These subgroups have in common that the subjects were previously employed although at the beginning of the program they are unemployed. This might suggest that having employment experience makes an individual more likely to have greater earnings if exposed to the treatment in such a way that the expected utility value is larger in this case. The number of subgroups that exhibit SOSD is in contrast with the 9 out of 24 subgroups that have a negative sample CATE, although none of those is statistically significant. The results for earnings are also different from the ones when the outcome is total income because in the former we are only capturing employment enrolment, whereas in the latter both employment and transfers are confounded. Moreover, as it will be explained in the robustness checks section, the subgroups for which the program was not welfare enhancing if using the income outcome is a subset of the corresponding subgroups when the outcome is average earnings.
The heterogeneity across subgroups can be theoretically explained by looking at the dif- That explanation works at two different levels. First, two different subgroups contain each homogenous individuals that behave one way or the other as described in the previous paragraph. Second, within a subgroup there is more than one type of individual and the explanation above works equally for each of them within the subgroup. This is an aspect we further discuss in the next section through the use of quantile treatment effects.
Within-QTEs
Another appealing feature of the method in this paper is that we can recover the quantile treatment effects (QTE) for each subgroup by taking the horizontal difference between the graphs of the two cumulative distribution functions for the outcome. Figure 7 shows the subgroup QTEs when the outcome is quarterly average earnings 36 . This is in some way an extension of the heterogeneity analysis of Jobs First in Bitler et al. [2006] except that here we disaggregated that heterogeneity by subgroups. The first thing to remark is that the increasing and then decreasing behavior of the QTEs is not characteristic to all the subgroups as it has been documented in that paper for the entire sample. Observe also how at the left of the distribution the QTEs are zero because at low income levels there are not any impacts on employment. In some subgroups the QTEs are rather a constant (subgroups 1, 7, and 23) and in a few cases with non-decreasing QTEs (subgroups 2, 13, and 15). The opt-in effect that Bitler et al. [2006] found at the upper quantiles and then confirmed by Kline and Tartari [2013] using partial identification arguments is present in almost all the subgroups.
We remain agnostic as to whether the behavior in subgroups 2, 13, and 15 is driven by behavior not captured before by other methods or whether the QTEs at extreme quantiles are not reliable enough. For the case of total income as the outcome, subgroups 19 and 22
show almost constant QTEs and subgroups 8 and 12 non-decreasing QTEs.
These within-QTEs also explain why in some subgroups the CATEs are positive and yet the decision making method suggests the opposite. For example, in subgroups 3, 8, and 15 the QTEs are both positive and negative depending on the specific interval of income we are looking at. This means that within these subgroups there is a lot of heterogeneity in the impacts, heterogeneity that is not captured by the CATEs, but it is captured by the utility theory analysis through the stochastic dominance because it uses the entire distribution over the subgroup instead of using one single statistic.
Robustness Checks
A related paper is the study by Bitler et al. [2010] where they further extend their analysis from their previous work 37 to disentangle heterogeneity within-and across-subgroups of the population in a randomized control trial. One of their conclusions is that when only using 36 There is no need to construct any confidence interval because these graphs were obtained by integrating out all the parameter uncertainty.
37 Bitler et al. [2006] .
covariates with information originated at the time of the program, it is not possible to distinguish heterogeneity of impacts across subgroups. However, when using covariates with information pre-program and contemporaneous covariates the opposite occurs. Our results are consistent with this in the sense that we find substantial heterogeneity across subgroups when using the two types of covariates but not so when we eliminate the use of pre-treatment variables. We evaluated this using the total income outcome and found that Jobs First would lead to higher expected utilities than not using the program over almost the entire population.
If we disregard the censoring problem of the data and only use the normal likelihood instead of the Tobit likelihood, the results are qualitatively identical as the ones shown in the tables for the case of total income. Not so for the case of average earnings where the censored part amounts to 27% of the total sample 38 .
As mentioned before, there are other covariates that could be used to evaluate the performance of the program such as a race variable. This would however be the subject of potential conflicts due to basing a decision on the expansion or restriction of the program to a different sample on this type of covariate. We analyze Jobs First when the outcome is total income by substituting the number of kids variable with a race variable that splits the sample into Hispanics or other race, black, and white individuals 39 . In this case four subgroups would not have been picked to be exposed to the treatment by the social planner. This contrasts with the results from the sample CATEs in which only one of those four subgroups had negative impacts. QTEs are relatively constant in four subgroups and only one subgroup exhibits a negatively sloped QTE curve.
Since there are not hyperpriors on the parameters of the prior for the subgroup precisions τ µ j , we ran a number of different specifications to measure the sensitivity to the hyperparameters α and β. Following our observations in Section 4.1, we ran the entire model with each of the combinations of parameter values shown in Table 7 and Table 8 and the rest of parameter values as in the main specification. Greater values for α and β would dominate the data in the smallest subgroups. None of our results on SOSD changes for any of those 38 We only present the results for the Tobit model as it handles the censoring problem, the results without the augmentation data step are available upon request.
39 These results are available upon request.
alternative specifications except for subgroups 9 and 19 for the case of average earnings and only for subgroup 10 for the case of total income when the ratio α/β is relatively large.
This might be the result of an exacerbated ratio in the variance for the conditional posterior distribution for τ µ j since the denominator, when → 0, becomes considerably smaller with respect to the numerator.
Conclusions
Heterogeneity of treatment effects is a relevant issue when extending or reducing the target population of a welfare program. There has been a literature exploring non-parametric methods to measure this heterogeneity and in a parallel way, a rather small literature has focused on mapping outcome distributions into expected utility theory criteria to make decisions. This paper combines those two literatures to develop a method that finds predictive outcome distributions conditional on covariates for treated and controls and maps those into second order stochastic dominance criteria. This gives a ranking of treatment versus control for each subgroup of the sample without having to specify the utility functional form other than minimal requirements. This can be used to assess whether to extend or restrict the program to a larger or smaller sample to maximize welfare.
We use a Bayesian approach since the size of the subsamples can be very small and classical approaches tend to not be reliable in these cases. Another issue is that the effect of the program in each subgroup is potentially correlated with other subgroups' effects since there might be covariates that make them similar and we did not capture that when dividing into the subsamples despite the random assignment to treatment. Our hierarchical Bayesian model allows for correlation across subgroups.
We find that one fifth of the number of subgroups in which we divided our sample does not maximize expected utility when exposed to the treatment, whereas almost twice as many show negative impacts using simple mean differences. This is because our method sheds light on the benefits from being assigned to the program not just from a point-estimation perspective, but by using the entire distribution of predictive outcomes in order to make a decision. We can also calculate quantile treatment effects by subgroup showing that as documented in previous studies, there is almost zero impact at low income levels, then positive impacts around the median and then negative impacts for the upper quantiles. This within-variation in part explains the discrepancy between the non-parametric methods and our approach.
Even though we have information on race, we do not believe it could successfully be used as a profiling covariate when extending or restricting a program to a different sample.
We let for future research the endogeneity of the number of subgroups and how to split the sample. A close approach to this, although not entirely solving the endogeneity problem, is to use a latent class model or mixture of normal densities to determine the probability of each individual belonging to each subgroup given an exogenous number of subgroups. Then we could compare across different models, each defined as a different number of subgroups, using Bayes factors.
Finally, learning about the differences in impacts across subsamples in a decision making framework can guide policymakers towards welfare improving modifications to the design of welfare programs.
Appendix Gibbs sampler
To get the posterior distribution of one of the subgroup means, we condition on all the other variables and the parameters of the model, where µ −j is the collection of the µ k with k = j,
, for j = 1, . . . , J so that each mean subgroup has a normal posterior distribution,
We can see that the posterior mean is a weighted average of the observations within the group and µ. The precision is a weighted sum of the precision of the income for subgroup j and the precision of µ j . Now, let's calculate the posterior distribution of µ. From the joint distribution, conditioning on the other variables we have that
or equivalently,
the posterior mean is a weighted average of the subgroup means and the posterior precision is a weighted sum of the precisions of the subgroup means and the precision of µ. Also note that these hyperparameters do not depend explicitly on the value of the observations.
The posterior distribution of τ µ j .
This expression is the kernel of a gamma distribution, the hyperparameters are
Observe that these hyperparameters do not depend on h 1 or h 2 in the conditional posterior distribution, but in the number of total observations and the overall sum of the squares of the deviations from the subgroup means.
Remember that we gave a prior on h 1 , the precision of the group means µ j ,
If A represents all the other parameters, the full conditional distribution for h 1 is
2 ). In the actual estimation, γ = 0.1. For h 2 we assume exactly the same prior as for h 1 but its posterior distribution is h 2 |A ∼ G(γ + 1/2, γ + 1 2
and γ = 0.1. Finally, ν was given the prior ν ∼ N (0, h 3 ). Its posterior distribution is
would be a constant. The initial parameters for the model are specified in Table 5 .
Tobit model
In the case of a mass point at Y = a the strategy to be adopted is a Tobit model (Dehejia [2005] ). To simplify the notation we will write everything as if a = 0. With this we transform the likelihood to be the one of a censored normal distribution. With this new likelihood there is a mass point on 0 and then a truncated normal distribution for the rest of the observations. This likelihood has the form
Where A represents all the parameters of the model and Φ is the normal cumulative distribution function. The priors are exactly the same as before. Following the idea of Chib [1992] for
Bayesian estimation of a model with censored observations, we can transform the likelihood into a product of normals as before. To do so, let's assume that there exist (hypothetical) negative observations of Y ij when we observe Y ij = 0. We can do that by simulating negative observations from truncated normal distributions with parameters µ j and τ µ . Now the mass point over 0 has been substituted by a collection of hypothetical negative observations that contribute to the likelihood as normal densities, leading to the same expressions at the beginning of this section.
Assume that the collection of observations for Y is {Ỹ ij }. But we observe the censored
There is a known, set valued function C ij so that
Then the joint distribution of observables and unobservables is
where
40 As in Geweke [2005] .
So that the joint distribution is proportional to
This expression is almost identical to the one presented at the beginning of this section. The censoring data is not a problem in the model because the posterior distributions will have the same kernels as before. But now the posterior kernels include those Y ij 's that are negative too. Then the posterior distributions will be slightly different.
The Gibbs sampler for this likelihood is like the one from the previous section except that now there is a data augmentation step. The Gibbs sampler from the previous section is now nested in the data augmentation step. In the first iteration, negative values are drawn from a truncated normal distribution to replace the observations of zero income. Then the Gibbs sampler from the previous section is carried out exactly as in the normal model. In order to get predictive distributions we need to slightly modify the algorithm from the normal model:
1. Get a random draw from the posterior distributions p(µ j |A) and p(τ µ j |A).
Get a random draw from
The last step can be done for treated and controls and for each j = 1, . . . , J this way:
1. get a random number u from a uniform density on [0, 1].
Otherwise, get a random draw from a truncated normal on [0, ∞) with the appropriate parameters. Note: Summary statistics for the entire sample by treated and controls. Each of the covariates is coded as a dummy variable equal to 1 if the described characteristic is true for the individual, except for the last two rows which are averages over the first 7 quarters since inception to the program. Note: * These subgroups exhibit SOSD from being exposed to the control over being exposed to the treatment. The subgroups listed are those for which the differences between the G functions are strictly positive over the interval [0, 5000] . Subgroups 3 and 9 would otherwise be in the table above for every specification if we allowed for very small negative values at the very low quarterly average earnings. Note: * These subgroups exhibit SOSD from being exposed to the control over being exposed to the treatment. The subgroups listed are those for which the differences between the G functions are strictly positive over the interval [0, 5000] . Note: Each graph represents the difference (treatment minus controls) between the graphs of G X (a) = a F X (t)dt where F X is the predictive distribution's CDF for earnings. If the resulting difference is negative then there is SOSD of being treated with respect to being assigned to the control group. Note: Each graph represents the difference (treatment minus controls) between the graphs of G X (a) = a F X (t)dt where F X is the predictive distribution's CDF for income. If the resulting difference is negative then there is SOSD of being treated with respect to being assigned to the control group. 
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